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THE RIGHT OF ELECTION
JOSEPH

A. Cox t

F ROm the early days of recorded history, there has existed a

policy of the law to provide for the surviving wife by setting aside a specified portion of her deceased husband's estate
for use during her widowhood. Evidences of such policy are
found in the Babylonian,' Hebraic, 2 Roman : and Saxon 4
laws. And in England, "at least as early as the reign of
Henry 1I [1154-1189], a man's goods were divided upon his
death into three equal parts, of which one went to his children, another to his widow, and the third in accordance with
his testament." I In England, where land was the primary
form of wealth, this policy manifested itself in common-law
dower.
Under the right of dower the law granted to the widow
the life use or income of a third of the lands of which her
husband had been seized of an estate of inheritance at any
time during the marriage.6 While early deemed a favorite
of the law 7 and as late as 1926 referred to as "perhaps the
most highly and widely cherished property right resulting
t Surrogate of New York County.
'DRIVER & MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 334-35 (1952);
Law Code of Haininurabi,15 A.B.A.J. 437, 440 (1929).

Urch, The

2 HOROWITz, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW § 214 (1953).
3 SOHm, THE INSTITUTES § 111, at 538 (3d ed., Ledlie 1907).

4 Wait v. Wait, 4 Barb. 192, 202 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); 1 SCRIBNER,
DOWER 6 (2d ed. 1883).
5 Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance,85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936). See
3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 550-56 (4th ed. 1935) ; 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348, 362 (2d ed. 1911).
6 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 190; Wait v. Wait, supra note 4, at 201-02;
1 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 119, at 441 (1949); 2 WARREN, WARREN'S WEED
On the
ON THE NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 69-70 (4th ed. 1951).
origin and development of dower, see 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 189-97; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 420-28; 1 SCRIBNER,

DOWER CC. I, II (2d ed. 1883) ; WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN LAW §30 (1923).
7 BACON, THE READING UPON THE STATUTE OF USES 38 (Rowe ed. 1804).

See Fern v. Osterhout, 11 App. Div. 319, 323, 42 N.Y. Supp. 450, 452 (3d Dep't
1896); 2 THoMtPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 869, at 584-85 (perm. ed. 1939).
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from marriage," 8 by the twentieth century, dower in New
York as a practical matter afforded almost no protection to
the widow-it was "in most cases, an illusion and decep-

tion." 9 The right of dower did not exist in personal property which, since the turn of the century, was likely to
constitute all or a large part of a man's wealth. 10 Dower
could be defeated by taking title to real estate in the name
of another or of a corporation, the shares of which are personal property." The unimportance and insignificance of
dower are further shown by the fact that only nine actions

to admeasure dower were commenced in New York County
from 1923 to 1927, and in 1925 and 1927 not a single action

was brought. In Kings County the average number of actions per year for the same period was only five.' 2 But while
inconsequential and inadequate, dower and the somewhat related protected expectation of the husband with regard to

the wife's realty, known as curtesy,13 constituted "serious
8 Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N.Y. 211, 216, 153 N.E. 51, 52 (1926).

9 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS, N.Y. CoMIssIoN TO INESTIGATE DEFECTS IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES 15 (reprinted 1935) (hereinafter
cited as COMBINED REPORTS).
10Id. at 14. It is further pointed out that examination of the records of
the New York County Surrogate's Court showed that ninety-six per cent of
intestates left no real property. Ibid. See also Powell & Looker, Decedents'
Estates, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 919, 936-45 (1930).
" Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N.Y. 197, 38 N.E. 280 (1894); Matter of Fox,
250 App. Div. 31, 293 N.Y. $upp. 468 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem., 275 N.Y.
604, 11 N.E.2d 777 (1937); Poillon v. Poillon, 90 App. Div. 71, 85 N.Y. Supp.
689 (1st Dep't 1904). See Note, 25 COLUTM. L. REV. 938 (1925).
1I 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REORTS 16-17.
13 At common law the husband had a right to the profits of his wife's
land, but this right ceased upon her death unless a child of the marriage capable
of inheriting from the wife had been born alive. In that event the husband
became entitled to a life estate in the realty of which his wife died seized.
Matter of Starbuck, 63 Misc. 156, 116 N.Y. Supp. 1030 (Surr. Ct. 1909),
aff'd, 137 App. Div. 866, 122 N.Y. Supp. 584 (2d Dep't 1910), aff'd ,nere.,
See Barry, Modernizing the Law of
201 N.Y. 531, 94 N.E. 1098 (1911).
Decedents' Estates, 16 VA. L. REv. 107, 122 (1929). Unlike dower, curtesy
could be defeated by the wife's conveyance or devise to others. Matter of
Starbuck, 137 App. Div. 866, 870, 122 N.Y. Supp. 584, 587 (2d Dep't 1910).
On the origin and development of curtesy, see 3 HoWSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 185-89 (4th ed. 1935) ; 2 PoU.oCx & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 414-20 (Zd ed. 1911); WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW § 31 (1923).
In this country dower and curtesy never existed in three states, and by
1925 dower had been abolished in twenty-four states and England, and curtesy
in thirty-six states and England. See 1928 LES. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS
67-80; 1 SCRIBNER, DOWER C. II (2d ed. 1883); 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 345-70 (1935).
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clogs on the alienation of real estate. The old bugaboo of
the common law marriage ruined many a conveyance." 14
Even at the beginning of the second quarter of this century, New York afforded complete freedom of testamentary
disposition except for the impediment of the ineffectual right
of dower, 15 the limitation on charitable bequests contained in
Section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law 16 and the minor
family exemptions.17 There was then a marked distinction
between the devolution of real estate and the distribution of
personal property as assets of an estate. Two separate systems of descent and distribution were in operation.' 8 In the
case of intestate succession, when the decedent was survived
by issue, his widow received one-third of his personalty together with a right of dower in the realty; when the decedent
was survived by no issue but by parents or brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, the widow's share of the personal property was increased to one-half with the same right of dower
existing.19

Although generally in the forefront of social legislation,
New York tolerated the ". . . glaring inconsistency in our
law which compels a man to support his wife during his lifetime and permits him to leave her practically penniless at
his death .
,, 20
14 Cummins, Recent Reforns in the Inheritance Laws of New York,
16 A.B.A.J. 785, 786 (1930).
15

See 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COM13INED REPORTS 16.

Id. at 18, where it is pointed out that "a man leaving a wife or children
or parent may give one-half of his estate to charity, and the other half to a
stranger, entirely ignoring those dependent upon him."
17 N.Y. SuRR. CT. ACT § 200. See 2 BUTLER, NEW YORK SURROGATE LAW
AND PRACTICE c. 27 (1941); 4 JESSUP-REDFIELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
SURROGATES' COURTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YoRuc c. 59 (rev. ed. 1949). There
also exists the seldom asserted widow's right of quarantine. N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 204; see 2 BUTLER, op. cit. supra § 1582; 4 JESSUP-REDFIELD, op. cit.
supra §§ 3042-43.
18 See 1928 LEG. DOc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 13-15.
19 Formerly N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 98; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 190.
See EAGER, INTESTATE SUCCESSION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 53, n.1 (1926),
16

where it is stated that until 1919 (Laws of N.Y. 1919, c. 295), even in the
case of personalty there was a difference in the rights of a surviving husband
or widow. Until such 1919 amendment to New York Decedent Estate Law
§ 100, a surviving husband was entitled to the entire unbequeathed personal
estate of his deceased wife, where the wife left no descendants, and he took
to the exclusion of parents, brothers, sisters, nephews, or nieces of the wife.
His right to the entire estate was derived from the- common law and was
unaffected by statute until the 1919 amendment.
2 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 18.
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Amidst this setting of injustice, anachrony, and anomaly,
the clarion call for legal reform was sounded in 1926 by Sur-

rogate James A. Foley.2 1 At the following legislative session

in 1927 an act was passed establishing a commission to investigate defects in the law of estates.2 2 This commission

was composed of four surrogates and three members of the
bar, all appointed by the governor, and eight members of the
legislature.23

It worked thoroughly and tirelessly.

It held

hearings throughout the state. 24 It submitted proposed legislation, which was introduced in February, 1928,25 but was
not pressed for passage. 26 Its primary purpose was to arouse
discussion and consideration among
interest and to evoke
27
lawyers and others.
The proposed statute provided for a new Section 18 of
the Decedent Estate Law entitled, "Election against or in
absence of testamentary provision." 28 In substance the section provided that a surviving spouse 29 should have a personal right of election to take his or her share of the estate
21 "Suggestions for Improvements in the Law of Estates," an address delivered on April 22, 1926, before The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York; reprinted in 7 LEcTuEs ON LEGAL Topics, THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 277-92 (1926).
22 Laws of N.Y. 1927, c. 519.
23 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 11. The commission selected
Surrogate Foley as chairman. Ibid.
24 See Cummins, Recent Reforrm in the Inheritance Laws of New York,
16 A.B.A.J. 785 (1930) ; O'Shea, Surviving Spouses in New York, 8 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 245 (1934); Twyeffort, The New Decedent Estate Law of New York,

6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 377, 396 (1926).

25 A. Int No. 1030. The commission report and the proposed legislation
were anticipated in an address by Surrogate Foley on January 20, 1928, before
the New York State Bar Association. 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED
REPORTS 145.
In addition to the proposed right of the surviving spouse to take against
the will of the decedent, discussed in the text, the bill proposed, inter alia,
a uniform rule of succession to real and personal property, the abolition of
dower and curtesy, the concentration of the vesting of estates in nearer and
more dependent relatives, removal of restraints in the conveyance of real estate
and the conferring upon administrators, executors and trustees of a statutory
power to sell, mortgage or lease lands. See AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE oN AMENDMENT OF THE LAW, BULL. No. 5,

memo. no. 94; Note, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 108 (1928).
26The- bill was, however, passed by the Assembly on March 22, 1928.
N.Y. LEmISLAT vE RECORD AND INDEX 165 (1928).
27 See Slater, Reforms in the New York Law of Property, 52 NEW YORK
STATE BAR AssocIATIoN REPoRTS 187, 190-91 (1929).
28 [1928] A. Int. No. 1030.
29 The rights of the husband and the wife were made uniform and reciprocal,
and the right of election made mutual. 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED
REPORTS 20. Thus there is no distinction as regards the right of election be-
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as in intestacy,3" subject only to the following limiting conditions: (a) such election should be in lieu of all testamentary provision, if any, and of any right of dower or curtesy; "'
(b) where the intestate share was over $25,000 and the surviving spouse by the will was given a life interest in an
amount equal to or greater than that share, the right of election would be limited to $25,000 absolutely, to be deducted
from the principal of the trust fund, and the terms of the
will would otherwise remain effective; 32 (c) where such
share was less than $25,000, the right to elect to take it abso3
lutely would exist regardless of any such provision;
(d) where a legacy or devise of $25,000 to the surviving
spouse was coupled with a trust of the difference between
$25,000 and the intestate share in which the surviving spouse
was given a life interest, there would be no right of election; 34 (e) where a legacy or devise less than $25,000 was
made to the surviving spouse, coupled with a trust of the
difference between that legacy or devise and the intestate
share, the right of election would be limited to take not more
than $25,000 outright, the difference between the legacy or
devise and $25,000 to be deducted from the principal of the
trust fundA5 Excluded from the benefits of the right of
election was a surviving spouse against whom or in whose
favor, a final decree of divorce recognized in New York had
been rendered, or against whom a final judgment of separation recognized in New York had been rendered, or who had
procured an out-of-state final judgment dissolving the marriage which was not recognized in New York, or was guilty
of abandonment, or who, being the husband, had neglected
tween a wealthy widower and a penniless widow. See Cahn, Restraints on
Disinheritance,85 U. PA. L. REv. 139, 145-46 (1936).
30 The 1928 bill, A. Int. No. 1030, provided for a new § 83 of the Decedent
Estate Law which set forth, inter alia, the intestate share of a surviving spouse.
That share was one-third of the entire estate where there was more than one
child (or his issue) surviving; one-half where only one child or his issue survived; $5,000 and one-half the balance, if no descendants but one or both
parents survived; $10,000 and one-half the balance where the parents were
dead and only brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces survived. Where the collaterals were more remote, the surviving spouse took the entire estate.
31 [1928] A. Int. No. 1030; N.Y. D xao. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (a).
32N.Y. DEcwD. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (b).
33

Id. § 18(1) (c).
18(1) (d).
5Id. § 18(1) (e). See 1928

3
4Id.§
3

LEG.

Doc. No. 70,

CONIBINED REPORTS

19-20.
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36
or refused to provide for his wife.

The proposed legislation was generally received in a
spirit of constructive criticism.3 7

Objection was voiced to the

proposal of giving the surviving spouse the privilege of withdrawing out of the trust fund so large an amount as $25,000
where the intestate share was over that sum. 3 8 It was
pointed out that no provision was made concerning minor
dependent children, 39 or settlements previously made in favor

of a wife,40 and that it was desirable to provide whether the
elected share was to be deducted from general or specific
legacies or from the residue, and what effect partial intestacy
should have.41 Finally, the proposed legislation was criticized for its failure to mention inter 42vivos transactions or
their effect upon the right of election.
The revised bill submitted to the 1929 legislature embodied several changes from the original draft.43 The amount
which the surviving spouse was, in certain cases, entitled to
withdraw out of a trust fund was reduced from $25,000

44

36 N.Y.DECED. EST. LAW §§ 18(3)-(5).

37 See, e.g., AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMmITTEE
ON AMENDMENT OF THE LAW, BULL. No. 5, memo. no. 94 (1928). "Recognizing that this bill in some respects should be modified and assuming that it will
be modified to become effective September 1, 1929, the bill is approved." Id.
at 174.
38 See Note, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1088, 1094-97 (1928).
39 Id. at 1094.
40
ASSOCIATiON OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRx, op. cit. supra note
37, at 170.
42Id. at 170-71. That the Decedent Estate Commission did consider the
problem is noted in Matter of Byrnes, 149 Misc. 449, 451, 267 N.Y. Supp. 627,
629-30 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
42See 52 NEw YoRx STATE BAR AssoCIATION REPORTS 214-38 (1929)
(comments by members of New York State Bar Association following address
by Surrogate George A. Slater on "Reforms in the New York Law of Property," id. at 187. These comments are revelatory in the light of the subsequent
history of § 18).
Such on-ission was apparently not unintentional, since, with few exceptions,
legislatures have hesitated to protect the surviving spouse's share from inter
vivos transactions, due partly to an unwillingness to interfere with the alienability of property and partly to the belief that a person possessing modest
means will not part with his estate during life so as to deprive his widow after
his death. See Derby, Disinheritance in New York, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rv. 247,
254 (1929); Comment, 44 MIcH. L. REv. 151 (1945).
The Decedent Estate Commission itself recognized "...
the advantage
of much constructive criticism and suggestion, to which it has given its careful
consideration... ." 1929 LEo. Doc. No. 62, COmBINED RFPORTS 178.
43 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937; 1929 LEG. Doc. No. 62,
COMBINE. REPORTS 175, the proposed § 18 of the Decedent Estate Law being
set forth at 186-88.
44 See text at notes 32-35 supra.
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In no event was the surviving spouse entitled

to more than one-half of the net estate after deducting debts,

administration expenses and any estate tax (provided the
full intestate share did not exceed $2,500, in which event
such spouse could claim it in full).46 A husband or wife
during the lifetime of the other could waive the right of election to take against any last will or against a particular last
will.4 7 Since the proposed legislation was to become effective on September 1, 1930,48 the right of election was given
to the surviving spouse only where the testator died after
August 31, 1930, leaving a will thereafter executed. 49

The

common-law estate of curtesy was abolished in the real property of a wife dying after August 31, 1930; 50 and the in-

choate right of dower or endowment of a widow in lands in
which her deceased husband had an estate of inheritance,
was abolished after August 31, 1930, except that a widow
married to a man before September 1, 1930, continued en45 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937; N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW
§§ 18(1) (b)-(f). In connection with this change in the withdrawal privilege,

the Decedent Estate Commission stated: "It was claimed that the withdrawal
of such an amount [$25,000] might impair trusts which would yield an adequate
income for the spouse particularly in moderate estates. The Commission has,
therefore, determined that the amount which may be taken in cash against a
trust created for the widow shall be reduced to $2,500. In many of the instances where this amount may be inadequate for immediate necessities, the
trust principal will probably be substantial, or power to invade will be expressly given." 1929 LEG. Doc. No. 62, COMBINED REPORTS 179-80. It appears
that the sum of $2,500 was a compromise. See Derby, Disinheritance in New
York, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 247 (1929).
The Commission rejected a proposal, such as is found in the Pennsylvania
statute, which would have permitted the surviving spouse to elect to take the
entire intestate share outright as against the terms of the will. 1928 LEG. Doc.
No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 19. In several states a surviving spouse was given
the privilege, in varying forms, to take a share against the provisions of a will.
See BEECHLER, ELECTIONS AGAINST WILS c. III (1940); 1930 LEG. Doc. No.
69, COMBINED REPORTS 251. The trust idea was adopted in order "to permit
the decedent to place such share in trust so as to safeguard the principal of
the trust against a spendthrift spouse." Slater, Reforms in the New York
Law of Property, 52 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS 187, 196

(1929).

46 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937; N.Y. DECED.
§§ 18(1) (a), (c).
47

EST. LAW

N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 18(9).

This effective date was
sought so that ". . . the legislature of 1930 will be able to consider any necessary and desirable amendments before the ultimate taking effect of the act."
48 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937.

1929 LEG. Doc. No. 62,

COMBINED REPORTS 180.
49 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937; N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW

§ 18(1).
50 [1929] A. Int. No. 1293; [1929] S. Int. No. 937; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 189.
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dowed of a third part of the lands in which her husband,
prior to such date, was seized of an estate of inheritance
during the marriage. 51
This final proposal received the unanimous 52 assent of
both branches of the legislature. In approving the bill 53 in
the presence of representatives of the -League of Women
Voters,5 4 Governor Franklin . Roosevelt characterized it as
ca new charter of women's rights," and Surrogate Foley
hailed it as "the greatest reform in the law of property of
New York State in one hundred years." 5 5
Implementation and interpretation of Section 18 have
been primarily the work of the courts."" Legislative amendment has been sparse. A 1930 amendment 57 provided that
an agreement made before September 1, 1930, wherein one
spouse waived or released all rights in the estate of the other
should be deemed to release the right of election granted in
the section. This same subdivision relating to releases was
again amended in 1947 5 so as to provide a single comprehensive statement of the requirements of a valid waiver of
a surviving spouse's right of election. A 1931 amendment 59
51 N.Y. RE.AL PROP. LAW § 190. For a recent application of this provision,
see Matter of Braun, 200 Misc. 23, 103 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
52 See Barry, Modernizing the Law of Decedents' Estates, 16 VA. L. REV.
107,53108 (1929).
Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 229.
54 See Barry, su/pra note 52, at 109.
55 Twyeffort, The New Decedent Estate Law of New York, 6 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 377 (1929).
Surrogate Slater, addressing the Federation of Bar Associations convention in December 1931, waxed even more ecstatic: "The new law is the law
of reason as applied to human society. The new law reduces what is reason
to public policy ... The Legislature refashioned the old law, and it was
made to keep pace with the intelligence and morals of the times." Slater,
The Work of the Revisers of 1930, reprinted in 1933 LEG. Doc. No. 55,
COM1BINED REPoRTs 793, 798.
ISIn the first two cases to reach the Court of Appeals it was held respectively that a testamentary gift in trust to pay the income to the widow during
her life or until she remarried was not a trust for her "benefit for life" within
the meaning of subdivision 1(e) [Matter of Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56
(1933)], and that a codicil executed after the effeotive date of the statute
had the effect of republishing the will so as to make § 18 applicable [Matter
of Greenberg,
261 N.Y. 474, 185 N.E. 704 (1933)].
5
7Laws of N.Y. 1930, c. 174, § 1, amending N.Y. DFxca. EST. LAW § 18(9).
SsLaws of N.Y. 1947, c. 379. See 1946 LEG. Doc. No. 65(H), RFPaor,
N.Y. LAW REVISION CommissioN 227-66; 1947 LaG. Doc. No. 65(A), id., 21-26.
59 Laws of N.Y. 1931, c. 562, § 1. The net estate was that left after the
deduction of debts, administration expenses and any estate tax. See text at
note 46 supra.
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provided that the words "intestate share," when used in the
section, should in no event be construed to mean more than
one-half of the net estate. In 1933,60 funeral expenses were
included among the deductions in ascertaining the net estate.
A 1955 amendment 61 redefined "intestate share" by providing that estate taxes should be disregarded.
Following the decision in Matter of Curley,62 wherein it
was held that a trust for the benefit of the widow which permitted the trustees, inter alia., to invest in non-legals and
exempted them from posting a bond, did not fulfill the statutory requirements, a new paragraph was added in 1936 to
subdivision one. 63 The amendment largely dissipated the
effect of the decision. The same legislature clarified subdivision seven relating to limitations of time within which
the election must be made.4 In 1939, sub-paragraph (f) of
subdivision one was amended to provide that:
In every estate the surviving spouse shall have the limited right to
withdraw the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars if the intestate share
is equal to or greater than that amount. Such sum shall, however,
be inclusive of any absolute legacy or devise, whether general or
specific. Where a trust fund is created for his or her benefit for life,
such sum of twenty-five hundred dollars or any necessary part thereof
to make up that sum shall be payable from the principal of such
65
trust fund.
It is generally agreed among those specializing in the
field covered by Section 18 that it has worked fairly well.
But room for betterment undoubtedly exists. Omissions in
the section itself as well as some judicial decisions construing
it call for continuous appraisal, with legislative action essential to obtain the desired results.
Laws of N.Y. 1933, c. 650, § 1 (a).
61 Laws of N.Y. 1955, c. 487, amending N.Y. DECE. EsT. LAW § 18(1) (a).
. [T]he words 'intestate share' wherever used in this section shall be construed to mean the surviving spouse's share of the estate as in intestacy or
one-half of such net estate, whichever is smaller. In computing such net estate
all estate taxes shall be disregarded, but nothing herein contained shall be
construed as relieving such surviving spouse from contributing to all such taxes
the amounts apportioned against him or her pursuant to the provisions of
section one hundred twenty-four of this chapter." Ibid.
62245 App. Div. 255, 280 N.Y. Supp. 80 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 269 N.Y.
548, 199 N.E. 665 (1935).
63 Laws of N.Y. 1936, c. 234.
4
60

6 Id. c. 114.
6s Laws of N.Y. 1939, c. 343, § 1.
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In view of the present value of the dollar, the privilege
granted to the surviving spouse of withdrawing $2,500 absolutely 6 61 appears unsatisfactory. A minimum of at least
double such amount should be permitted to be withdrawn.

Inquiry should be made concerning the desirability of providing in some manner for minor dependent children during

their minority.6 7 In view of the fact that provision for a
surviving spouse and the retention of freedom of alienation
68
have long been conflicting policies in the law of property,
the legislature should determine as a matter of policy judgment whether decedents should be permitted through the

medium of such devices as the Totten Trusts 6 9 and joint
accounts 70 to disinherit effectively the surviving spouse. In
similar manner, the legislature should decide whether a surviving spouse of an intestate decedent should have rights
Estate Law comparable
under Section 83 of the Decedent
71
to those conferred by Section 18.
The Decedent Estate Commission of 1927 might well be
proud of its work.

Section 18 has proved a workable and

just reform. To the legislature must be entrusted such
amendments as experience has proven desirable.
66

N.Y. DEcD. EsT. LAW §§ 18(1) (b)-(f).

Cf. the 1928 bill with its pro-

posal to permit withdrawal of $25,000. See text at notes 32-35 supra.
67 This was one of the criticisms directed to the 1928-1929 proposals. See
text at note 39 supra. The Decedent Estate Commission apparently partly
considered the matter as Surrogate Slater expressed the hope that "this subject
may be studied by a Commission and the law of the State humanized so that
at least minor children may be permitted to share in a parent's estate." Slater,
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